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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS:
THE SUPREME COURT STRIKES DOWN SODOMY
STATUTE BY CREATING NEW LIBERTIES AND
INVALIDATING OLD LAWS
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
I. FACTS
Harris County Sheriff officers responded to a weapons disturbance
report at the home of John Lawrence.' Upon entering the apartment and
conducting a search for the weapons, the officers observed Lawrence en-
gaging in sodomy with another male, Tyron Garner.2 The officers then
arrested and jailed Lawrence and Garner (petitioners) and held them in
custody until the following day. 3
The Texas Legislature revised its sodomy law in 1973 by making it a
misdemeanor offense to engage in a deviate sexual act with another indivi-
dual of the same sex. 4 In Texas, engaging in same-sex sodomy is a
misdemeanor offense and punishable by a fine. 5
The petitioners appealed for a trial de novo in the County Criminal
Court after their conviction in the Justice of the Peace Court.6 The County
Criminal Court denied a motion by the petitioners to quash the charges.7 In
this motion the petitioners contended that the sodomy law violated the equal
protection and privacy guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. App. 2001). The individual that reported
the weapons disturbance said that there was "a black male.., going crazy in the apartment and he
was armed with a gun." Brief for Respondent at 2, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No.
02-102).
2. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 350. The individual who reported the weapons disturbance later
admitted the allegations were false and was convicted of filing a false report. Brief for Petitioners
at 2, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).
3. Petitioner's Brief at 2 n.1, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
4. Respondent's Brief at 39, Lawrence (No. 02-102). Prior to 1973, the criminality of con-
sensual sexual conduct did not differentiate between same-sex and different-sex conduct.
Petitioners' Brief at 5, Lawrence (No. 02-102). Before 1973, Texas also criminalized fornication
and adultery but repealed the statutes in 1973. Id. (describing the legislative history of TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 2003)). Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as any contact
between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth and anus of another person. Id. at 6
(citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01 (Vernon 2003)).
5. Petitioner's Brief at 6 n.4, Lawrence (No. 02-102) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.23
(Vernon 2003)). The fine cannot exceed $500. Id.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id.
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United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution.8 The petitioners
asserted that the law violated their rights in its application and on its face.9
After the petitioners pled nolo contendere, the court administered a fine and
court costs. 10
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth
District of Texas.'l A panel of three judges held that the prosecution of the
petitioners under Texas' sodomy law violated the Equal Rights Amendment
of the Texas Constitution.12 The State filed a motion to rehear the case en
banc with the court.13 The Court of Appeals granted the State's motion,
and the en banc court reversed the panel's holding.14 The sole question
before the appeals court was whether Texas' prohibition of same-sex
sodomy was facially unconstitutional. 15 The en banc court held that a state
may legitimately exert, in the form of legislation, laws that "bear a real and
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase
of the general welfare."16 The court held that neither the state nor the
federal constitutions contain express guarantees of privacy. 17 The court
recognized that the Supreme Court has created some inferred rights to
privacy that place certain limitations on governmental powers.18 However,
the court rejected applying these inferred privacy rights and stated that the
Supreme Court has not created a privacy right for private sexual conduct,
which is immune from state intervention. 19 The appeals court noted that
"[w]hile a Legislature is not infallible in its moral and ethical judgments, it
8. Id. The Texas Constitution states in relevant part: "Equality under the law shall not be
denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin." TEX. CONST., art. 1 §3a
(1997).
9. Petitioner's Brief at 3, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
10. Id. Under Texas' procedural rules, pleading nolo contendere preserves all previously
asserted defenses. Id. (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 44.02 (Vernon 2003)). The Court
fined each petitioner $200 and levied court costs of $141.25. Id. Since the petitioners entered
pleas of nolo contendere at trial, the facts and circumstances of the offense are not in the
subsequent court records. Id.
11. Brief for Respondent at 2, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102). In
Texas, a ruling originating in a "Texas justice court to a county court may be further appealed to a
court of appeals if the fine exceeds $100 or the sole issue is the constitutionality of the statute on
which the conviction is based." Id. at 2 n.4. The petitioners did not contest, on appeal, the con-
duct of the police that lead to their discovery and arrest. Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349, 350
(Tex. App. 2001).
12. Respondent's Brief at 2, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
13. Id.
14. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Lawrence (No. 02-102).
15. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 350.
16. Id. at 359.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 360.
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alone is constitutionally empowered to decide which evils it will restrain
when enacting laws for the public good."20
The petitioners then filed an appeal directly from the Fourteenth Circuit
Court of Texas to the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari. 21 The Court held that the petitioners had a
"right to liberty under the Due Process Clause [that] gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention from the government"
and reversed the lower court.22
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
When the United States Supreme Court addresses the constitutionality
of an issue involving liberty, it must address several factors to determine its
validity.23 First, the Court must determine if the liberty attempting to be
invoked is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 Second, the Court
must examine whether this liberty is a fundamental right that requires
heightened judicial scrutiny. 25 Third, the Court has to apply the appropriate
level of scrutiny against the interest claimed by the state that is imposing
the law. 26 Finally, the Court must balance its determination with the prin-
ciple of stare decisis to determine if precedent guides the Court's deter-
mination and application.27
A. LIBERTY UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The Due Process Clause found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution states that no person may be deprived of "life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." 28 The Supreme Court has
held that the Due Process Clause guarantees more than a process and that
the right to liberty encompasses more than the absence of physical
restraint.29
A prima facie reading of the Due Process Clause may allow one to
conclude that the Clause only focuses on the process by which life, liberty,
20. Id. at 362.
21. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
22. Id. at 578.
23. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-53 (1992).
24. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
25. Id. at 191.
26. Id. at 196.
27. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
29. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).
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or property is taken.30 However, the United States Supreme Court has
determined that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
"substantive content" that creates "subsuming rights that to a great extent
are immune from federal or state regulation or proscription." 3' Subsuming
rights are rights that are recognized through case law despite having little or
no textual support in the Constitution.32 The Federal Constitution protects
these subsuming rights from invasion by the states because the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as procedural
matters. 33
The Bill of Rights protects the most familiar substantive liberties, and
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most of the rights enumerated by
the Bill of Rights to the states. 34 The Supreme Court has never held that
only the specific, enumerated rights found within the Constitution are
protected. 35
1. Expansion of Liberties to Couples
The Court first began to extend individual liberties under the Due
Process Clause in Griswold v. State of Connecticut.36 The Court stated that
the implicit liberties under the Due Process Clause included the right to a
zone of privacy that was free from government intrusion.37 In Griswold,
the Court held that there existed a zone of privacy, created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees, that precluded government intrusion
into the private bedroom of married couples. 38
The issue in Griswold was whether the State could ban the distribution
of contraceptives to married individuals. 39 The Court cited the right of
30. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
31. Id. The Supreme Court originally decided that an individual enjoys liberties outside the
enumeration of the constitution in 1887. See generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
The roots of liberty can be traced back to the Magna Carta's per legem terrae, which provided
safeguards against usurpation and tyranny. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J.
dissenting) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884)).
32. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 191. Examples of subsuming rights that have no textual support
in the constitution include the right to child rearing and education. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 530-36 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). The right to privacy also
has no textual support, but it also has been recognized as a constitutional right. Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 483 (1965).
33. Casey, 505 U.S. 846-47 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927)).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
37. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-84.
38. Id. at 485-86.
39. Id. at 485.
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privacy for couples as the reason it struck down the law banning the
distribution of contraceptives. 40
The Court illustrated that the Constitution contained an implicit right to
privacy by showing that the First Amendment contained a penumbra where
privacy of one's associations was protected from governmental intrusion. 41
Similarly, the Third Amendment's prohibition against quartering of
soldiers, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unlawful search and
seizure, and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination all
have a penumbra of privacy.4 2 This penumbra of privacy is no less im-
portant than any other right that is carefully and particularly reserved to the
people.43 Moreover, the Ninth Amendment guarantees that the Bill of
Rights is not to be construed as exclusive of other rights retained by the
people.44 The Court held that the right to use contraceptives in a married
bedroom was within the zone of privacy created by these guarantees. 45
2. Extension of Liberties to Individuals
The Court extended the privacy rights of married couples, recognized
in Griswold, to individuals who were not married in Eisenstadt v. Baird.4 6
In Eisenstadt, the Court overturned a law which prohibited single indi-
viduals from obtaining contraceptives yet allowed married persons to obtain
the same contraceptives. 47 The Court reasoned that the decision to beget
children was so fundamentally basic that the right to privacy should protect
individuals whether they were married or unmarried.48
40. Id.
41. Id. at 483.
42. Id. at 484; see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (stating
that people have a privacy in one's associations); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656
(1961) (stating that a person's right to privacy is no less than any right particularly reserved to the
people by the Bill of Rights).
43. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
44. Id. at 484.
45. Id. at 485-86.
46. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
47. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. The Court said that a "marital couple is not an independent
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup." Id.
48. Id. at 453. The Founding Fathers "'sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
man."' Id. at 453-54 n.10 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
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3. The Extension and Boundaries of the Right to Privacy
The Court further extended the implicit right to privacy in Roe v.
Wade.4 9 In Roe, the Court held that a Texas criminal statute that prohibited
abortions at any stage of pregnancy, except to save the life of the mother,
violated a woman's implicit constitutional right of privacy.50 The Court
cited the due process reasoning found in Griswold and Eisenstadt as a
justification for the extension of an individual's right to privacy from state
intrusion.51  The Court noted that the Constitution did not explicitly
mention any right of privacy; however, as far back as 1891 the Court had
recognized a right of personal privacy.52 The Court determined that this
right of privacy was broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to
have an abortion. 53 However, the Court recognized that the right to privacy
was not absolute, and that it had never recognized an unlimited right of
privacy.5 4
4. Supreme Court Affirmed the Existence of the Right to Privacy
and its Boundaries
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,55 the
Court not only reaffirmed the central holding of Roe, but also determined
that certain procedural requirements, which had to be met before an abor-
tion could be performed, were unconstitutional. 56 The Court concluded that
women had the right to have an abortion under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment before viability without undue interference
from the State. 57 In reaffirming the right of privacy, the Court noted that
the right to terminate a pregnancy was neither defined by the Bill of Rights
nor practiced by any state at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted.58 However, when defining a liberty not expressly stated in the
Constitution, the Court must weigh the proposed individual liberty versus
the liberties and demands of an organized society.59 The Court emphasized
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152, 154.
51. ld. at 152-53.
52. Id. at 152 (citing Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
53. Id. at 153.
54. Id. at 154 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905); Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200, 208 (1927)).
55. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
56. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
57. Id. at 834.
58. Id. at 835.
59. Id. at 834. The Court quoted Justice Harlan, stating:
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that history has proved that other liberties created by the Court were
undoubtedly correct. 60 The Court recognized that individuals of good con-
science can disagree about certain profound and moral implications, but the
Court has an obligation to define the liberty of all and not to mandate its
own personal moral code.61 Therefore, a state may not compel or enforce
one view upon an individual and suppress that individual's constitutionally
protected right. 62
B. SCRUTINY
The Supreme Court has established a specific method in analyzing
substantive due process questions. 63 This process is necessary because the
Court has been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process
in fear of moving into uncharted and open-ended areas. 64 The starting point
for this analysis is whether the right is a fundamental right.65
1. Scrutiny Under the Due Process Clause
If a liberty is determined to be a fundamental right, a state must over-
come a greater burden of legitimacy for its law in order to infringe on that
right.66 If it is not a fundamental right, the law must at least be rationally
related to a legitimate government interest.67
The substantive portion of the Due Process Clause creates implicit
liberties that are outside the bounds of the contextual Constitution. 68 The
"[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found
in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the
Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the
taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and
bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable search and seizures; and so on. It is a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,... and which also recognizes, what a
reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment."
Id. at 848 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
60. Id. at 834. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1967) (allowing interracial
marriages); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (holding sterilization was against
equal protection); Pierce v. Soc'y. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530-36 (1925) (holding parents had a
right to send their children to private school versus a public school).
61. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
62. Id. at 851.
63. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
64. Id. at 720.
65. Id. at 720-21.
66. Id. at 719-20.
67. Id. at 727-80.
68. Id. at 720.
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Court has created two different formulas to define such liberties. 69 First,
the substantive Due Process Clause protects fundamental rights and liberties
which are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed."70 Second, in substantive-due
process cases the Court has required a careful description of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest. 71
When the Court considers an interest a fundamental liberty, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government
from infringing on those fundamental liberties "'unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."' 72 Only those fun-
damental rights that are deeply rooted require heightened scrutiny under the
analysis of the Due Process Clause.73
In Washington v. Glucksberg,4 the question before the Court was
whether individual liberties protected by the Due Process Clause included a
right to commit suicide with the assistance of others. 75 The Court held that
laws against suicide have been consistent and almost universal in tra-
dition.76 Therefore, since the right of suicide was not a fundamental right,
the State of Washington only needed to provide a rational basis for the
law.77 The Court stated that Washington's ban on assisted suicide was at
least reasonably related to the State's interest in protecting and promoting
the life of its citizens. 78
Therefore, only if a liberty is found to be a fundamental right will it be
protected by a heightened level of judicial scrutiny. 79 If the liberty is not a
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, the lower level of
scrutiny, rational basis, is applied by the Court.80
69. Id. at 720-21.
70. Id. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
73. Flores, 507 U.S. at 303.
74. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
75. Washington, 521 U.S. at 723. The laws in question prohibited someone from knowingly
aiding another in attempting suicide. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(l) (2000)). Any
attempt of assisting a suicide was punishable by up to five years in prison and up to a $10,000
fine. Id. at 705 (citing WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9A.36.060(2), 9A.20.021(l)(c) (2000)).
76. Id. at 723. The Court noted that almost every state has banned suicide. Id.
77. Id. at 735.
78. Id.
79. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
80. Id. at 196.
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2. Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause requires that the classification of an
individual rationally further a legitimate state interest.8 1 A heightened re-
view is only necessary if a classification jeopardizes the exercise of a funda-
mental right, or categorizes an individual on the basis of an inherently
suspect characteristic. 82
In Romer v. Evans,83 the United States Supreme Court held an
amendment to the Colorado State Constitution unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 4 The amendment
prohibited all legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect
homosexual persons from discrimination.8 5 The Court noted that under the
Equal Protection Clause a law must bear a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate government purpose.8 6  However, "a bare ... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest." 87 Rational basis scrutiny allows laws that are enacted for broad
and ambitious purposes to be upheld if legitimate public policies are
demonstrated, despite the incidental disadvantages they may impose on
certain persons.88 The Court should sustain a state law if it advances "a
legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to
the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems
tenuous." 89 However, the Colorado constitutional amendment did not
further a proper legislative end; instead it made homosexuals unequal to
everyone else. 90 Typically, the Court stated, a classification based on one's
choice of sexual partners does not require heightened scrutiny because
homosexuality is not a suspect classification.9 1
81. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
82. Id.
83. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
84. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 635.
87. Id. at 634 (citing Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 543 (1973)).
88. Id. at 635.
89. Id. at 632. The reason scrutiny classifications are used by the courts is to provide "gui-
dance and discipline for the legislature, which is entitled to know what sorts of laws it can pass,
and it marks the limits of the [court's] own authority." Id. Therefore, "[bly requiring that the
classification bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we
ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by
the law." Id. at 633.
90. Id. at 635.
91. Id. A court upheld the Army's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy as constitutional under the
First Amendment. Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996) cert. denied sub nom.
Richenberg v. Cohen, 522 U.S. 807 (1997). A court upheld the Navy's actions of releasing an
individual because he was homosexual, stating that it was rationally related to a legitimate
2004]
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3. Determination If Sodomy is a Fundamental Right Under the
Scrutiny Test
To determine if sodomy is a liberty deeply rooted in the Nation's
history and tradition, the Court must ascertain if sodomy has ancient roots
in American law.92 Courts typically do this by examining if sodomy prac-
tices have been condemned in Western civilization through Judeo-Christian
moral and ethical standards. 93
The history of prohibiting sodomy acts can be traced back to Biblical
times and Hebraic law. 94 However, most scholars have concluded that
sodomy was not an offense at the earliest common law.95 The first indi-
cation of a formal statute prohibiting the practice of sodomy was in 1533
after the English Reformation transferred powers of the ecclesiastical courts
to the temporal courts. 96 The Statute of Henry VIII, which came from the
temporal court, famously coined the act as a "crime against nature." 97
The common law established by the temporal court carried over to the
original thirteen states.98 At the time they ratified the Bill of Rights, all
made sodomy a criminal offense at common law. 99 This continued
throughout the nation, as every state in the union outlawed sodomy until
1961.100
In Bowers v. Hardwick,101 the Court addressed whether the liberty to
engage in sodomy was deeply rooted in America's history. 102 The Court
purpose. Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1003 (1990). A court noted that a serviceman's discharge because of a fraudulent disclosure
on his enlistment stating he was not a homosexual did not violate his substantive due process
rights. Rich v. Sec'y of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984).
92. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-93 (1986).
93. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
94. Aimee D. Dayhoff, Comment, Student Articles: Other Rising Legal Issues-Sodomy
Laws: The Government's Vehicle to Impose the Majority's Social Values, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1863, 1865-66 (2001) (citing Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 648 (1969)). Harris referred to
the story of Sodom and Gomorrah and their destruction because of sexual immorality. Harris,
457 P.2d at 648. Other references in the Hebrew Testament referencing sodomy come from the
translation of the Hebrew word qadesh or qedeshim as perverted persons, meaning ones who
practice sodomy and prostitution in religious rituals. See Deuteronomy 23:17; 1 Kings 14:24,
15:12, 22:46; 2 Kings 23:7; Job 36:14 (New King James Version) (Thomas Nelson, Inc.); see also
Leviticus 18:22; 20:13 (New King James Version).
95. Harris, 457 P.2d at 649.
96. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
97. Id. The "crime against nature" statute was repealed during the reign of Bloody Mary, but
was reenacted upon the rise of Elizabeth I. Harris, 457 P.2d. at 649 n.42.
98. Id. at 192.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 193.
101. 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
102. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92.
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rejected the contention that sodomy was a fundamental right and should be
protected by a higher level of scrutiny against the States. 103 The Court
stated that it was "facetious" to claim the right to engage in sodomy was
deeply rooted or implicit in the concept of liberty because of the consistent
prohibition of the act throughout American jurisprudence. 104
C. STARE DECISIS
The Supreme Court must give deference to the doctrine of stare decisis
when looking to overrule a prior case and its precedent. 05 The concept
underlying stare decisis is that the judicial system requires conformity and
continuity among decisions, but at the same time evolution and changing
factual scenarios may require reversal if the prior ruling has become so
clearly in error that its legitimate enforcement is in question. 106
Since the rule of stare decisis is not absolute, a court must consider
four factors when it reexamines a prior holding.107 First, the court must ask
if the prior rule has proven to be intolerable and not practicable.OS Second,
the court must balance the amount that society has relied upon and adjusted
to the rule against the special hardships and consequences that may arise
from overruling that rule.l0 9 Third, the old principal should be overruled if
related principles of law "have left the old rule as no more than a remnant
of abandoned doctrine."110 Finally, a court must examine if the facts have
changed or come to be seen so differently that the old rule is robbed of its
significant application or justification. 111
In Casey, the United States Supreme Court readdressed the central
issue in Roe v. Wade: whether women have a protected liberty from state
interference under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.112 The Court reaffirmed the holding of Roe even though the under-
pinnings of Roe had been severely criticized.113 The Court reasoned that
the central holding had not become unworkable despite a change in
103. Id. at 192.
104. Id. at 194.
105. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 854-55.
108. Id. at 854.
109. Id. Stare decisis is the "doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to
follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999).
110. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 846.
113. Id. at 860.
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technology.'14 The Court noted that if the balance of interest does not tip
within the normal bounds of stare decisis, precedent must still control
despite some criticism of its premises and the movement of time and
technological advancements. 115
D. THE SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS A STATE LAW PROHIBITING THE
PRACTICE OF SODOMY
In Bowers, the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing
sodomy."16 The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
decision that held that the statute violated an individual's fundamental
right' 17. The Eleventh Circuit found that because homosexual activity was
a private and intimate association that the state cannot infringe upon by
reason of the Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.l18 The Court framed the issue as whether the
Federal Constitution conferred a "fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy.,19 The Court rejected the appellate court's holding that
sodomy was similar to other fundamental rights identified by the Court such
as family, marriage, and procreation.120 The Court stated it was "quite un-
willing" to announce that the right to engage in homosexual sodomy was a
fundamental right.' 2' The Court concluded that the right to engage in
homosexual sodomy was not a fundamental right because the existence of
proscriptions against such conduct was found throughout the Nation's
history. 122
114. Id. The Court said the essential holding of Roe recognized a woman's right to choose
an abortion before fetal viability, and that the undue burden test, rather than the trimester
framework, should be used in evaluating abortion restrictions before viability. Id. at 844, 846.
115. Id. at 861.
116. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). The Georgia statute prohibited sexual
acts that involved the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. Id. at 188 n. 1.
The statute on its face did not discriminate against homosexuals or heterosexuals. Id. An indivi-
dual convicted of the offense of sodomy was punished by imprisonment for one to twenty years.
Id. at 188; GA. CODEANN. § 16-6-2 (1998).
117. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
118. Id. at 189. The respondent, Hardwick, was charged with violating the Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy by engaging in sodomy acts with another adult male in his home. Id. at
187-88. The respondent brought a suit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of
the statute because it placed him in imminent danger of arrest. Id. at 188. The district court dis-
missed for failure to state a claim. Id. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, which reversed the district court's ruling. Id. at 189.
119. Id. at 190.
120. Id. at 191.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 192-93. The Court noted that "[slodomy was a criminal offense at common law
and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen States when they ratified the Bill of Rights."
Id. Also, in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified "all but five of the thirty seven
States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws." Id. Each of the fifty states actually outlawed
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The Court also rejected the respondent's contention that the
Constitution protected the right to engage in sodomy because it occurred in
the privacy of the home.123 The Court stated that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not protect otherwise illegal conduct just because it occurred in
the home. 124
Finally, the Court rejected the petitioner's contention that there was no
rational basis for the law other than the majority of the electorate in Georgia
believed that homosexual sodomy was immoral and unacceptable.125 The
Court stated that if it were to use the Due Process Clause to invalidate all
laws that were enacted because a majority of a state's citizens believed the
act was immoral, the court system would be "very busy."'126
III. ANALYSIS
In Lawrence v. Texas,127 Justice Kennedy delivered the majority
opinion of the Court, in which Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer joined. 128 The majority overturned Bowers
and held the Texas statute prohibiting same sex sodomy unconstitutional
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 29 Justice
O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the result; however, she would not
have overruled Bowers.130 Instead, she would have invalidated the Texas
statute under Equal Protection grounds of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 3 '
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas.132 Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissenting
opinion. 133
sodomy until 1961, and at the time of the Bowers' decision, twenty-four states and the District of
Columbia provided criminal penalties for acts of sodomy performed in private between consenting
adults. Id. at 193-94.
123. Id. at 195.
124. Id. The Court cited other victimless crimes that included the possession and use of
illegal drugs, firearms, and stolen goods and those things that happen in the privacy of a home. Id.
The Court also stated that it would be "difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to
homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest and other sexual crimes
even though they are committed in the home." Id. at 195-96.
125. Id. at 196.
126. Id.
127. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
128. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 561.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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A. MAJORITY OPINION
The Court concluded that the Texas statute infringed on an individual's
privacy as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.134 Because the question before the Court required the Court
to determine whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in private
acts under the liberty of the Due Process Clause, the Court needed to
reconsider the holding of Bowers. 135
1. The Extension of Privacy and Liberty Under the Due Process
Clause
The Court reasoned that the substantive reach of liberty under the Due
Process Clause was broad and well established by the Court. 136 The Court
referenced Griswold as a case that described and protected the interest of
the right to privacy, evidenced by the protection extended to marriage rela-
tions and the protected space of the marital bedroom. 137 The Court also ac-
knowledged that this right to privacy extended beyond the marital bedroom,
as held in Eisenstadt.138 Although the Court recognized that Eisenstadt was
decided under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court stated that Eisenstadt
recognized the fundamental proposition that married individuals and single
individuals were entitled to the same liberties. 139
The Court found that the "protection of liberty under the Due Process
Clause had a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining
the rights of the person." 140 The Court cited Roe for the proposition that a
woman's right to an abortion was not absolute, but her right to elect an
abortion was an exercise of her liberty under the Due Process Clause. 141
134. Id. at 564, 578
135. Id. at 564.
136. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Pierce v. Soc'y. of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923)).
137. Id. at 564-65 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485).
138. Id. at 565.
139. Id. The Court in Lawrence quoted Eisenstadt regarding the conflict between the state
law and fundamental human rights:
"It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship .... If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."
Id. (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original)).
140. Id.
141. Id.
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2. The Majority Criticizes the Holding in Bowers
The Court stated that the factual circumstances between Lawrence and
Bowers were similar; however, the statute in question in Bowers prohibited
sodomy whether or not the participants were of the same sex, while the
statute in Lawrence applied only to participants of the same sex. 142 The
Court held that the Bowers decision failed to appreciate the extent of liberty
at stake in the case. 143 The Court said the question in Bowers focused too
heavily on whether an individual had the right to engage in a sodomy act.144
The Court noted that this narrow interpretation of the question demeaned
the individual's claim, just as it would have demeaned a married couple's
assertion that marriage was simply about the right to have sexual inter-
course.145 The Court stated that the laws involved in both cases extended
beyond more than just prohibiting sexual acts. 146 Instead, the penalties
reached into and affected the most private of places, the home.147
3. Bowers' Incorrect Assumption of Sodomy in American History
The Court criticized Bowers' presumption that proscriptions against
sodomy have ancient roots in America.' 48 The Court noted that since the
beginning of colonial times there was prohibition of sodomy that was de-
rived from the English criminal laws. 149 The Court opined that early
English common law interpreted the prohibition against sodomy to include
acts between same and different sex couples.So The Court said this inter-
pretation was followed in nineteenth-century America where sodomy,
buggery, and crime-against-nature statutes also criminalized relations be-
tween men and women and between men and men.151 The Court reasoned
the aim of the prohibition of sodomy was toward nonprocreative sexual
activity, not the regulation of immorality, since the categorization of sod-
omy did not depend on an individual's sex, along with the fact that
homosexuals as a distinct category did not arise until the late nineteenth
century.152
142. Id.
143. Id. at 566.
144. Id. at 567.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 568-69. The early English law against sodomy included "relations between men
and women as well as relations between men and men." Id. at 568 (citing King v. Wiseman, 92
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Furthermore, the Court held that a substantial number of sodomy
prosecutions did not happen within the confines of private homes, but
instead were convictions for predatory acts against those who did not
consent. 153 The laws typically prohibited acts against minors or victims of
an assault in order to ensure a legal remedy if a predator committed a sexual
assault that was not covered in a typical rape statute. 154
The Court noted that even the evidentiary standards required for a same
sex sodomy conviction indicated the common law's unwillingness to crimi-
nalize same sex sodomy.155 The Court reasoned that this evidentiary rule
contributed to the infrequency of prosecutions and made it difficult to deter-
mine whether society approved of rigorous and systematic punishment of
the consensual acts committed in private by adults.156 Therefore, the Court
held that Bowers could not distinguish the longstanding criminal prohibition
of homosexual conduct for nonprocreative sex and the prosecution for the
immorality of the sexual act. 157
The Court concluded that the movement to punish only homosexual
sodomy in America did not develop until the last third of the twentieth
century. 5 8 The Court stated that "it was not until the 1970's that any state
singled out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution."159 Nine states
have criminalized homosexual sodomy since the 1970s, and several of those
states have moved toward abolishing the law.160 Therefore, the Court found
Eng. Rep. 772, 775 (K.B. 1718)). The interpretation and the use of "mankind" in the Act of 1533
included woman and girls. Wiseman, 92 Eng. Rep. at 775.
153. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 569 (2003).
154. Id. The Court cited a nineteenth century treatise involving predatory acts of an adult
man against a minor girl or minor boy. Id. (citing 2 J. Chitty, CRIMINAL LAW 47-50 (5th Am. ed.
1847). The treatise noted that "instead of targeting relations between consenting adults in private,
the nineteenth-century sodomy prosecutions typically involved relations between men and minor
girls or minor boys, relations between adults involving force, relations between adults implicating
disparity in status, or relations between men and animals." Id.
155. Id. The Court said an example of this unwillingness was the fact that testamentary
evidence could not be used from the consenting partner, because the individual was considered an
accomplice in the crime. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. A significant number of prosecutions of consensual, homosexual sodomy between
consenting adults in America between 1880 and 1995 involved conduct in a public place, not in
the private home. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 570-71. States that have criminalized homosexual sodomy since 1970 include:
Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Tennessee, Texas, and Oklahoma. Id.
(citing 1977 Ark. Acts No. 828; 1983 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 109, § 1; 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, § 90;
1977 Mo. Laws, S.B. 60; 1973 Mont. Laws § 1, ch. 513; 1977 Nev. Stat. 866, 1632; 1989 Tenn.
Pub. Acts ch. 591, § 39-13-510; 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 399; Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105, 1109
(Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (invalidating sodomy law as applied only to heterosexual couples).
States that have moved toward abolishing their laws include Arkansas, Montana, Tennessee, and
Nevada. Id. at 571 (citing Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 353-54 (Ark. 2002); Grycazan v.
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that the historical premise on which the majority relied in Bowers was more
complex and overstated than the Justices in Bowers acknowledged. 161
4. States' Right to Enforce Morality
The Court acknowledged that there have been powerful voices that
condemn homosexual conduct as immoral, and that this condemnation has
"been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable
behavior, and respect for the traditional family."162 However, the Court
rejected the notion that these beliefs justified laws prohibiting sodomy. 63
Instead, the Court stated that the issue was "whether the majority may use
the power of the State to enforce [its] views on the whole society through
operation of the criminal law."164 The Court held that it was a court's
obligation to protect an individual's liberty, not set its own moral code. 165
The Court reasoned that the statements by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White in Bowers, regarding the lengthy history of lawful state
intervention relating to homosexual conduct, were incorrect. 166 The Court
stated that not only was the conclusion in Bower regarding disapproval of
sodomy in the Judeo-Christian society incorrect, but it was also irrele-
vant.167 According to the Court, the law of the last half-century was the
more appropriate starting point for any analysis of tradition.168 Applying
the traditions and trends over the last half century, the Court found a
growing "awareness" that liberties give substantial protection to adult indi-
viduals "in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining
to sex." 169
State, 942 P.2d 112, 126 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 265-66 (Tenn.
App. 1996); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 502-03 (Ky. 1992); 1993 Nev. Stat.
518).
161. Id. at 571.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Southwestern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992)).
166. Id.
167. Id. The Court said that although history and tradition are the starting point in most
cases, it is not the ending point in the substantive due process inquiry. Id. (citing County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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5. Emerging Trends Not to Criminalize Homosexual Conduct
The Court criticized Bowers for failing to recognize the trend not to
criminalize homosexual conduct. 170 The Court noted that the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code recommended that consensual sexual
activities conducted in private should not be criminally penalized.171 In
addition to the Model Penal Code, the Court took notice of a British
Parliament committee recommendation, which was issued in 1957 and
adopted ten years later, that all laws created by the British Parliament
punishing homosexuality should be repealed. 72 The Court also noted that
the European Court of Human Rights recently found that a law that
criminalized sodomy was invalid under the European Convention on
Human Rights.173 Therefore, the Court concluded that these cases from
Britain and the European Court proved that the contention made in Bowers
was incorrect. 174
The Court noted that the deficiencies in Bowers had become even more
apparent in the years following the decision.175 The Court stated that the
twenty-five states Bowers cited as having sodomy laws was reduced to thir-
teen at the time of the Lawrence decision, and of those thirteen states, only
four enforced their laws against homosexual conduct.176
6. Protection of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Court examined two cases, Casey and Romer, that defined the
rights of an individual to engage in private sexual conduct under the Four-
teenth Amendment.177 The Court recognized that Casey "reaffirmed the
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 at 372 (1980)). The justification for the
ALI decision was based on three grounds: "(1) The prohibitions undermined respect for the law
by penalizing conduct many people engaged in; (2) the statutes regulated private conduct not
harmful to others; and (3) the laws were arbitrarily enforced and thus invited the danger of
blackmail." Id. The Court pointed out that all fifty states prohibited sodomy before 1961, and
twenty-four states and the District of Columbia had sodomy laws at the time of Bowers. Id.
However, Justice Powell noted in Bowers that these prohibitions often were being ignored. Id.
The Court pointed to Georgia, which had not enforced its sodomy law for decades. Id.
Additionally, as of 1994, the state of Texas had not prosecuted anyone under its sodomy laws for
acts committed in private between consenting adults. Id. at 573.
172. Id. at 573 (citing generally COMM. ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION,
THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND
PROSTITUTION (Stein & Day, 1963)).
173. Id. (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 573-74.
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substantive force of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." 78
Thus, the Court held that the Casey decision "confirmed that our laws and
tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education."1 79 The Court stated that persons in a homosexual relationship
may also seek these purposes, but Bowers would deny them that right. 180
The Court concluded that under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, laws that were no more than animosity toward a
group cannot further any rational relation to a legitimate government
purpose.' 8 ' Romer, the Court noted, stands for the proposition that persons
who were grouped as classes relating to their homosexual conduct were
deprived of their protection under state anti-discrimination laws.182 Despite
the fact that Romer was decided under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court found the case was still relevant in showing that the holding of
Bowers was in doubt.183 The Court believed the Equal Protection Clause
argument was persuasive because conduct and equality of treatment are
linked, and one interest cannot be advanced without the other. 184
7. The Law's Stigma Against Homosexuals
The Court stated that if a protected conduct was made into a criminal
act, and the Court did not challenge its substantive validity, a stigma might
remain despite its nonenforcement.185 The Court noted the mere criminali-
zation of sodomy by a state invited and subjected homosexual persons to
discrimination in public and private spheres. 86 Therefore, the Court found
that the holding in Bowers demeaned the lives of homosexuals, and that the
stigma was not trivial.187 The Court determined that although the penalty
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
180. Id. at 574. The Court stated:
"These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."
Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)).
183. Id. at 575.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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for the conviction of sodomy was minor, it remained a criminal offense
with all the inferences that accompany a crime. 188 This stigma, the court
claimed, would be personified because the conviction of consensual homo-
sexual conduct under the Texas statute would require the individual to
register as a sex offender in at least four states. 189 In addition to sexual
offender registration, a conviction under the Texas criminal statute carried
all other consequences associated with convictions, such as notations on job
applications. 190
8. Stare Decisis
The Court recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis was essential in
our judicial system; however, the Court noted it was not an inexorable
command.191 The Court stated that individual or societal reliance on pre-
cedent should caution the Court against reversing its prior course when
addressing a constitutional liberty interest. 192 However, the Court found
that society had not relied upon the ruling in Bowers in such a way that it
would cause a detrimental effect if Bowers were reversed.193 The Court
concluded this was because Bowers itself created uncertainty, which,
combined with the Court's decisions following Bowers, made society
hesitant to rely upon the holding in Bowers.194 The Court stated, "Bowers
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today." 95
188. Id. In Texas, it is a Class C misdemeanor. See TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.23
(Vernon 2003) (stating a Class C misdemeanor is publishable by a fine not exceeding $500).
189. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). The four States that would require
registration as a sex offender include Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Id.
(citing IDAHO CODE §§18-8301 to 18-8326 (Cum. Supp. 2002); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. §§
15:540-15:549 (West 2003); MiSS. CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-21 to 45-33-57 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-3-400 to 23-3-490 (Law. Co-op 2002)).
190. Id. at 576.
191. Id. at 577.
192. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855-56
(1992)).
193. Id.
194. Id. The Court quoted Justice Stevens' dissent in Bowers to show its uncertainty when
Bowers was decided in saying:
"Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral
is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history
nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.
Second, individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their
physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of
'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married
persons."
Id. at 577-78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
195. Id. at 578.
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Therefore, the Court overruled Bowers and declared its precedent no longer
binding. 196
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's holding that the Texas
sodomy law was unconstitutional.197 However, instead of overruling the
statute and invalidating Bowers under the substantive part of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice O'Connor stated she
would have invalidated the statute under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and left Bowers as good law. 198
Justice O'Connor stated that the Equal Protection Clause was the
appropriate judicial scrutiny to apply because the Court has typically used
the Clause when challenging legislation inhibiting personal relationships.199
Justice O'Connor argued that the Court had frequently held that if the
objective of a law was "a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular
group," that law did not further a state's legitimate interest.200 Justice
O'Connor stated that when a law exhibits characteristics harmful to a
politically unpopular group, the Court applied a more searching form of
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.201
Justice O'Connor claimed that application of the Texas statute unfairly
harmed individuals with a homosexual orientation while having no effect
on heterosexual couples. 202 This discrimination, O'Connor argued, "makes
homosexuals unequal in the eyes of the law." 203 She said that since that
conduct, and only that conduct, was subject to criminal sanction, homo-
sexuals are inherently treated differently than other members of society.204
Justice O'Connor argued that this disparagement in treatment unfairly
burdened those individuals because it would disqualify or restrict convicted
persons to engage in many professions and would require them to register
as sex offenders in Texas.205 Beyond the tangible implications of con-
viction under the Texas statute, Justice O'Connor said the mere presence of
the law branded all homosexuals as criminal because calling someone a
196. Id. at 578-79.
197. Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 580.
200. Id. (quoting Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 581.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. Those professions include medicine, athletic training, and interior design. Id.
(citing TEx. Occ. CODE. ANN. §§ 164.05 1(a)(2)(B), 451.251(a)(1), 1053.252(2) (Vernon 2003)).
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homosexual imputed that someone committed a crime, which would make
it more difficult for homosexuals to be treated the same as everyone else.206
She concluded that the Texas sodomy statute "subject[ed] homosexuals to
'a lifelong penalty and stigma."' 207
Justice O'Connor dismissed Texas' argument that the statute should
survive rational basis review because it furthered the legitimate government
interest of the promotion of morality.208 Justice O'Connor also disagreed
with Texas' claim that the holding in Bowers justified the state's position
that moral disapproval can be a legitimate state interest that passes rational
basis scrutiny. 209 She argued that the facts presented in Lawrence were dif-
ferent than Bowers because only homosexuals were prosecuted.210 Further-
more, Justice O'Connor argued that the Court had never held that moral
disapproval alone "is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection
Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons." 211
Justice O'Connor noted that the infrequency of prosecution under the
sodomy law showed the laws were not in place to stop sodomy, but instead
to serve as a statement of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals. 212
Justice O'Connor concluded that the sodomy law "rais[ed] the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected."213
Justice O'Connor rejected Texas' assertion that the sodomy law did not
discriminate against homosexual persons; but rather discriminated against
homosexual conduct. 214 Justice O'Connor stated that when the conduct and
persons were so closely related, the law targeted more than just conduct. 215
In fact, the law was "directed towards gay persons as a class," and since the
act itself, which defines the class, was criminalized, the criminalization of
that act discriminated against the class.2 16
206. Id. at 583-84 (citing Plumley v. Landmark Chevrolet, Inc., 122 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir.
1997)).
207. Id. at 584 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982)).
208. Id. at 585.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT
Justice Scalia concluded that the Court gave into a crusade by indivi-
duals who wished to overrule Bowers.217 He argued that the majority gave
no deference to stability and that most of the majority's opinion had nothing
to do with the question of whether the Texas statute actually furthered a
legitimate state interest under rational basis scrutiny. 218
Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's discussion about whether
sodomy was a fundamental right. 219 He also argued that the majority's fail-
ure to actually declare that sodomy was a fundamental right under the Due
Process Clause fell short of typical judicial standards of review. 220
According to Justice Scalia, the majority did not apply the appropriate strict
scrutiny standard of review when the Court concluded that sodomy was a
fundamental right.221 He submitted that because the Court failed to deter-
mine whether sodomy is a fundamental right, it left the central holding of
Bowers unaddressed.222 Instead, Justice Scalia reasoned that the Court
rested its holding on the petitioner's right to engage in a liberty and pro-
tected this interest with an "unheard-of form of rational-basis review that
will have far-reaching implications beyond this case." 223
1. Stare Decisis
Justice Scalia criticized the majority for not adhering to the doctrine of
stare decisis.224 He argued that the Court failed to follow proper procedures
to determine if the precedent in Bowers had become unworkable. 225 Justice
Scalia stated that the proper test for stare decisis was to overrule an "erro-
neously decided precedent" if a case's foundation was eroded by subse-
quent decisions, and it had been subjected to substantial criticism. 226
Justice Scalia asserted that Casey did not contribute to the eroding of
Bowers' precedent because it did not create a more expansive right to abor-
tion than did Roe, which had been decided at the time of Bowers.227 Justice
Scalia agreed with the majority that the decision in Romer has "'eroded' the
217. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 587.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 588.
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'foundations' of Bowers' rational basis holding;" however, he contrasted
this with the fact that Washington equally eroded Roe and Casey, which are
still good precedent. 228
Second, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's contention that
Bowers had been subjected to substantial and continuing criticism.229 He
criticized the majority's historical assumptions, which were based on two
textbooks.230 Justice Scalia argued that Roe and Casey had been subjected
to as much or more criticism than had Bowers.231
Finally, under the stare decisis analysis, Justice Scalia asserted that
there has been great social reliance on the fundamental holding of
Bowers-that government can regulate morality.232  Justice Scalia con-
cluded that there had been "countless judicial decisions and legislative
enactments" that were premised on the "ancient proposition that a
governing majority's belief that certain sexual behavior is 'immoral and
unacceptable' constitutes a rational basis for regulation." 233 Justice Scalia
contended that laws prohibiting "bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity"
were only sustainable if Bowers' fundamental holding of a state's right to
regulate morality was recognized. 234
Justice Scalia argued that the overturning of Bowers would have a
greater societal impact than overturning Roe.235 He reasoned that over-
ruling Roe would return society to the status quo holding of centuries of
jurisprudence, while overturning Bowers would create new
228. Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640-43 (1996)).
229. Id.
230. Id. (citing CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-
A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 81-84 (Simon & Shuster) (1991); RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON
341-350 (Harvard Univ. Pr.) (1992)). Justice Scalia pointed out that Posner wrote that the deci-
sion of the Bowers Court was correct in stating that the right to participate in homosexual acts was
not deeply rooted in America's history and tradition. Id. at 589 n.1 (citing POSNER, supra note
230, at 343).
231. Id. at 587.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 589-90 (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality
opinion, Scalia, J., concurring) (relying on Bowers to uphold a state's public indecency statute)
Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (1lth Cir. 2001) (citing Bowers in upholding a law
prohibiting the sale of sex toys); Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812, 814 (7th Cir. 1998) (relying on
Bowers for the proposition that legislatures can regulate based on morality rather than just
demonstrable harms); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)
(relying on Bowers to ban homosexual conduct in the military); Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43, 53
(Md. 1999) (relying on Bowers to hold that no one has the right to engage in sex outside of
marriage); Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464, 469-473 (Tex. 1996) (relying on Bowers to state
that there exists no constitutional right to engage in adultery).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 591.
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jurisprudence. 236 Justice Scalia concluded that the Court's analysis, the
same that was used in Casey, was completely result-oriented.
237
2. Scrutiny
Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's analysis about whether
sodomy was a fundamental right,238 and even if it was a fundamental right,
the Constitution allowed for the prohibition of it so long as there was due
process of the law.239 Justice Scalia stated that there was no absolute right
to liberty under the Due Process Clause.2 40 He argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment protected certain liberties, but the Amendment expressly al-
lowed states to deprive their citizens of any liberties so long as the due
process of law was followed.241
Justice Scalia noted that under the doctrine of substantive due process a
state may infringe a fundamental liberty interest if it is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling State interest.2 42 Justice Scalia noted that only funda-
mental rights, which are deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,
qualified for this form of heightened scrutiny. 243 Justice Scalia indicated
that all other liberty interests may be enforced pursuant to a validly enacted
state law if that law was rationally related to a legitimate State interest.
244
Justice Scalia argued that Bowers rejected using a heightened scrutiny
because sodomy was not a fundamental right.245 Justice Scalia claimed that
since the majority failed to declare sodomy a fundamental right, the ma-
jority left the core holding of Bowers unturned.2 46
3. Bowers Had Support at the Time it Was Decided
Justice Scalia asserted that the law at the time Bowers was decided
supported its proposition.2 47  Justice Scalia noted that Griswold and
Eisenstadt did not premise their holdings on the doctrine of substantive due
236. Id.
237. Id. at 592.
238. Id. at 593.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part, "No state shall... deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
242. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 594.
247. Id.
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process248 Furthermore, Scalia noted that Roe declared the right to an abor-
tion was a fundamental right, unlike sodomy, and the decision in Casey re-
jected the notion that abortion laws must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest. 249
4. Historical Analysis of Bowers' Holding
Justice Scalia reasoned that the majority's holding, that sodomy was
not historically criminalized, was incorrect. 250 Justice Scalia noted that the
majority conceded that sodomy was criminalized in America's history and
that sodomy between same sex partners was not distinguished until later in
history. 25' Justice Scalia contended that the only relevant point was that
sodomy was criminalized in order to establish that homosexual sodomy was
not deeply rooted and did not qualify for a fundamental right status. 252
Justice Scalia concluded that the majority did not dispute the facts on which
Bowers actually relied.253
Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's contention that sodomy
performed in private was rarely prosecuted and that this was evidence that
private sodomy was not what the law was intended to prohibit.254 Justice
Scalia disagreed and argued that private consensual sodomy was not often
prosecuted because of the difficulty of proving such a crime rather than the
fact that a state chose not to prosecute the crime. 255 Justice Scalia stated
that there were 203 prosecutions for consensual adult homosexual sodomy
from 1880 to 1995, along with twenty sodomy prosecutions and four
executions during the colonial period.256 Justice Scalia contended that these
cases proved that homosexual sodomy was not deeply rooted and thus, the
holding in Bowers, was "utterly unassailable."257
Justice Scalia then addressed the majority's assertion that "an emerging
awareness" was happening in America in regards to determining how
individuals may conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. 258
248. Id. at 595.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 595-96.
253. Id. at 596.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 375 (Harvard Univ. Press) (1999) (reporting the number of prosecutions documented
within state and national law reporters); JONATHAN KATZ, GAY/LESBIAN ALMANAC 29, 58, 663(Carroll & Graff) (1983) (describing the number of prosecutions during the colonial period)).
257. Id.
258. Id.
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Justice Scalia argued that an emerging awareness did not establish a
fundamental right, and he criticized the majority for basing its premise on
the Model Penal Code's reluctance to punish sodomy because these provi-
sions of Code were actually "a point of resistance" by many states that con-
sidered adopting the Code.259 Furthermore, Justice Scalia asserted that
constitutional entitlements were not created because some states lessened or
eliminated criminal sanctions on certain behavior. 260 Justice Scalia con-
tended that foreign laws did even less to create constitutional entitlements
and were meaningless dicta. 261
5. Rational Basis Scrutiny
Justice Scalia examined the majority's main contention that there was
no rational basis for the sodomy law.262 He stated that the majority's opin-
ion effectively ends all moral legislation. 263 Justice Scalia stated that such a
declaration would invalidate laws against "fornication, bigamy, adultery,
adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity." 264
6. Justice Scalia on the Concurrence
Justice Scalia analyzed the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor,
who would have overturned the statute on equal protection grounds. 265
Justice Scalia contended that the statute applied equally to all persons, men
and women, heterosexual and homosexual, on its face. 266 Justice Scalia
conceded that the statute could only be violated with same sex partners;
however, he claimed that this cannot itself be a denial of equal protec-
tion.267 Justice Scalia pointed to the constitutionally valid state laws pro-
hibiting marriage of same sex partners and determined that if the marriage
law was valid, the sodomy law should similarly be valid.268
Justice Scalia disagreed with Justice O'Connor's claim that the law
unequally discriminated because it discriminated regarding the "sexual pro-
clivity" of the perpetrator of the crime. 269 Justice Scalia argued that even if
259. Id. at 598 (quoting ESKRIDGE, supra note 256, at 159.)
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 599.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 600.
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it was unequally discriminative, only a rational basis was needed, not "'a
more searching form of rational basis review.' 270
7. Scalia Said the Court Signed onto a Social Agenda
Justice Scalia stated that the majority's holding effectively said that
what many Americans believe as protecting family values from immoral
and destructive influences was actually now discrimination.271 To prove
this assertion, Justice Scalia noted that the "anti-anti-homosexual" culture
was not "mainstream," as indicated by Congress's repeated rejection of
adding homosexuals to Title VII protection. 272
Justice Scalia stated that citizens should have the right to persuade
other fellow citizens to change the laws in favor of their cause.273 Justice
Scalia argued that the premise of the democratic system was for the people
to create the rules, not the government.274 Justice Scalia asserted that one
reason for this premise was that people, as opposed to the courts, do not
have to take things to their logical conclusion. 275 Justice Scalia determined
that was why a society can maintain laws that prohibit same-sex marriages
and justify criminalizing homosexual acts. 276 Therefore, Justice Scalia said
that when the Court decrees a ruling like the one in Lawrence, any funda-
mental justification that prohibited laws against homosexual marriage were
eroded away. 277 Justice Scalia argued that under the Court's analysis the
right of the state to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples was shaky
because those laws were also based on moral disapproval. 278
270. Id. at 601.
271. Id. Justice Scalia stated that "[many Americans do not want persons who openly
engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as
teachers in their children's schools, or as boarders in their home." Id. at 602.
272. Id. at 603.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 604.
277. Id.
278. Id. Justice Scalia noted that the
[O]pinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a
distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal
recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct
is "no legitimate state interest" for purposes of proscribing that conduct, and if as the
Court coos (casting aside all pretense of neutrality), [w]hen sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring, what justification could there
possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising
"[tihe liberty protected by the Constitution."
Id. at 604-05 (citations omitted).
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D. JUSTICE THOMAS'S DISSENT
Justice Thomas concluded that the Texas statute was "uncommonly
silly," and that he would vote to repeal the law if he was a member of the
Texas Legislature. 279 However, as a member of the Court his duty was to
decide cases according to the Constitution and the laws of the United
States.280 Accordingly, he argued there was no right in the Constitution or
Bill of Rights to a general right of privacy or liberty.281 Therefore, Justice
Thomas would have upheld the statute under a constitutional analysis.2 82
IV. IMPACT
The Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence has been called a historic
decision with sweeping implications. 283 The ruling has created enormous
political, social, and legal commentary on the ruling itself and its possible
affects on other similarly premised laws. 284
A. IMMEDIATE EFFECT
The decision struck down all laws that made homosexual sodomy a
criminal act and effectively invalidated all sodomy laws criminalizing both
homosexual and heterosexual sodomy.28 5 States that had bans on homo-
sexual sodomy included Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Mis-
souri.2 86 States that banned different and same sex sodomy included Idaho,
Utah, Louisiana, Mississippi, Massachusetts, Alabama, Florida, South
Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia. 287
279. Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Editorial, Staring Down Stare Decisis, N.J. L. J., July 21, 2003, available at Westlaw,
003 N.J.L.J. 194; Jonathon Turley, Sex and the Supreme Court, RECORDER (San Francisco) July
25, 2003, at 5.
284. Turley, supra note 283, at 5.
285. Id.
286. Dayhoff, supra note 94, at 1894 n.8 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie
1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1995); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (West 1999); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 2002); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 2003)).
287. Dayhoff, supra note 94, at 1894 n.8 (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 (1994); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 800.02 (West 2000); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:89 (West 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 34 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
750.158 (1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1999); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (2003); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 2003)).
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B. POSSIBLE IMPACTS
However, the majority's decision created vagueness in jurisprudence
by combining the implicit right of privacy and the explicit right of liber-
ty.288 This extension of explicit and implicit rights and liberties created not
only the right to engage in a particular type of sexual activity, it gave cre-
dence to the argument that government should stay out of activities, sexual
or otherwise, between consenting adults conducted in the privacy of their
home.289 This ruling may have brought into question any law that regulates
private, consensual relationships between adults.290 Because of the
Lawrence decision, some commentators believe that not only is a legisla-
ture's ability to regulate private, consensual relationships between adults,
including criminal statutes such as sodomy, bigamy, polygamy, incest and
adultery, at risk, but also laws on child custody, adoption, military service,
hiring practices, insurance provisions, nonprofit associations, and other
incidences of daily living may also be unconstitutional. 291 Courts have
already had to address whether Lawrence gives homosexual foster parents
the right to adopt children, whether a parent has the constitutional right to
engage in incest with his daughter, and whether a state's statutory rape
statute is valid.292 The ruling also brings the possibility of gay marriage to
the forefront of public discussion. 293 The decision in Lawrence is likely to
serve as a legal foundation for marriage between homosexual couples.2 94
The first major impact of the vague new jurisprudence created by
Lawrence was found in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,295 a
Massachusetts Supreme Court case.2 96 The Massachusetts Supreme Court
288. Editorial, Judicial Activism in Pursuit of Social Policy, DAILY RECORD (Baltimore),
Aug. 18, 2003, (on file with North Dakota Law Review).
289. Id.
290. Robert Peters, Morality: Is it the Business of Government, July 16, 2003, at
http://www.cultureandfamily.org/articledisplay.asp?id-4276&department=CFI&categoryid=cfrep
ort (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
291. A. Eric Johnston, High Court Decree Ends Morals Legislation, at
www.sodomylaws.org/lawrence/lweditorials38.htm (last visited July 7, 2004).
292. See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dept. of Children & Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th
Cir. 2004) (holding that homosexual foster parents did not have a constitutional right to adopt
children in light of Lawrence); see also State v. Freeman, 801 N.E.2d 906, 908-10 (Ohio Ct. App.
2003) (holding Lawrence did not give a father the constitutional right to engage in incest with a
daughter despite the fact she consented and was of legal age); see also State v. Clark, 588 S.E.2d
66, 67-69 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that Lawrence did not give an adult male the right to
engage in sexual relations with a twelve-year-old female despite the fact she consented).
293. Joseph N. Ducanto, Supreme Court Shows Winds Shifting on Gay Marriage, 26 CHI.
LAW., Sept. 2003, at Westlaw, 9/03 CHIL 68.
294. Id.
295. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
296. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948-49.
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held that a law prohibiting homosexuals to enter into a civil marriage
violated their state constitutional guarantees of equality and liberty. 297 The
Massachusetts Supreme Court cited Lawrence, saying that it was the courts
obligation "to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code." 298 The Massachusetts Supreme Court opined that Lawrence left the
question whether a state may bar same-sex couples from civil marriage
open as a matter of federal law. 299 The Massachusetts court referenced
Lawrence as defining that whom to marry and how to express sexual in-
timacy were among the most basic individual liberties and due process
rights that an individual possessed. 300 Therefore, the Massachusetts court
concluded that the ban on same-sex civil marriages did not meet the rational
basis test for either due process or equal protection, and struck the ban
down as unconstitutional. 301
The Lawrence opinion is likely to cause great confusion and make the
job of legislatures more difficult.302 The majority's loose use of the term
fundamental rights obscures the Courts true rationale for the decision.303
The Court never truly decreed that sodomy, much less homosexual sodomy,
was a fundamental right.304 Proof that the majority never found sodomy as
a fundamental right was its application of mere rational basis scrutiny. 305
Therefore, by applying only rational basis scrutiny, the Court implicitly said
that the mere justification of perceived morality was not enough to meet
legitimate state interests. 306 This conclusion seemed to depart from the
traditional thoughts on what is law and what law does regulate, as laws
often run parallel to morality. 307
C. APPLICATION TO NORTH DAKOTA LAW
The United States Supreme Court's decision to strike down the Texas
statute does not directly affect any North Dakota law because North Dakota
297. Id. at 958-60.
298. Id. at 948 (citing Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003)).
299. Id. at 949.
300. Id. at 959.
301. Id. at 961.
302. Judicial Activism in Pursuit of Social Policy, supra note 288, (on file with North Dakota
Law Review).
303. Id.
304. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 594 (2003).
305. Id. at 578.
306. Id. at 590.
307. Harlan Grant, The American Challenge to International Law: A Tentative Framework
for Debate, 28 YALE L.J. 551, 576 (2003).
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no longer has any law prohibiting sodomy. 308 However, the implication of
the Supreme Court's ruling could be felt in North Dakota. North Dakota
does have laws prohibiting fornication, adultery, incest, deviate sexual acts,
and bigamy.3 09 These laws are the same laws that are based largely on
societal morals whose durability in light of the decision in Lawrence, was
questioned by Justice Scalia. 310 In addition, North Dakota only allows mar-
riages between a man and a woman. 311 The issue of same-sex marriages
was specifically addressed as not within the scope of the Court's decision,
but Justice Scalia's dissent argued that the majority's opinion eroded away
the legal premise of denying same-sex couples marriage rights. 312
V. CONCLUSION
In Lawrence, the United States Supreme Court further extended the
liberties of an individual and broadened an individual's right to privacy. 3t 3
The Court held that a state did not have a legitimate interest in regulating
private, sexual, conduct between consenting adults in the home.314 Since a
state does not have a legitimate interest in regulating one type of morality
based law, the decision opened the door for more constitutionally based
challenges of morally premised laws.315
Ryan M. Bernstein
308. 1973 N.D. Laws ch. 117. The repealed statute stated:
Every person who carnally knows... any male or female person by the anus or by or
with the mouth, or voluntarily submits to such carnal knowledge.., is guilty of
sodomy and shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than
one year nor more than ten years, or in the county jail for not more than one year. Any
sexual penetration however slight is sufficient to complete this crime.
N.D. REV. CODE § 12-2207 (1943) (repealed 1975).
309. N.D. CENT. CODE. §§ 12.1-20-08 to 09, and 11 to 13 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
310. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
311. N.D. CENT CODE § 14-03-01 (West Supp. 2003). North Dakota's definition of a
marriage is:
[A] personal relation arising out of a civil contract between one man and one woman
to which the consent of the parties is essential. The marriage relation may be entered
into, maintained, annulled, or dissolved only as provided by law. A spouse refers only
to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
Id.
312. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586-94.
313. Id. at 558-87.
314. Id. at 578.
315. Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
